I work primarily in the areas of epistemology and philosophy of mind though I also have broad interests in Modern philosophy (particularly Kant) and the philosophy of Cognitive Science. Below you can find out more about some of my current research projects.
Self-knowledge
Transparent Self-knowledge and the Normativity of Belief (Dissertation)
In my dissertation, I offer a novel explanation of transparent self-knowledge. In the first part of my dissertation, I argue that the most influential explanation of transparency, namely, epistemic accounts à la Alex Byrne and Jordi Fernández, fail to provide an adequate explanation of this phenomenon. I also argue that, though superior to epistemic accounts, agentialist accounts of transparency also face significant challenges.
The second part of my dissertation argues that, though there are several viable concepts of belief available in the philosophical literature, if we are to understand transparent self-knowledge and the problems that attend it, we will need to privilege the concept of belief as a normative attitude. I argue that any sufficient understanding of transparent self-knowledge will require that (i) we endorse a normative concept of belief and (ii) we recognize that this concept of belief, the concept of transparent self-knowledge, and that of rational agency are interdependent (i.e., in defining any one of them, we will need to make use of the others). This claim helps to explain both how we are able to make self-ascriptions via transparency and the nature of our entitlement to such self-ascriptions.
Self-knowledge and Cognitive Phenomenology
Though my dissertation deals extensively with issues pertaining to self-knowledge, I hope to continue to develop my work in this area in the future. One paper that is currently under review focuses on the difficulties involved in a “reasons account” of self-knowledge. In his essay, “Reasons and Self-Knowledge,” Conor McHugh attempts to lend support to the ‘reasons account’ of self-knowledge. His strategy is to deploy a particular notion of non-sensory, cognitive phenomenology in an attempt to explain the way in which a first-order mental state can serve as a reason for the self-ascription of a second-order state. I argue that this strategy does not succeed for reasons having to do with the nature of cognitive phenomenology. However, this paper is just one part of a general project that investigates what role phenomenology can play when it comes to knowing our own mental states.
Kant and Contemporary Epistemology
Kantian Notions of Assent
Kant takes the notion of assent, or more literally ‘holding-to-be-true’ (Fürwahrhalten), to be the fundamental epistemic attitude. The taxonomy of this attitude is complex and branches into various propositional attitudes each of which is differentiated from the others in terms of the evaluative character of the assent, or, what Kant calls the ‘sufficiency’ of the assent. Thus, Kant will not speak of justification per se; instead, an assent is evaluated in terms of its subjective or objective sufficiency. There is a fundamental lack of agreement among interpreters regarding how to understand his concept of sufficiency and the notion of objective sufficiency in particular. I am currently working on a project that attempts to map out the logical space in which this concept functions. Indeed, there appear to be three possible ways in which one might understand Kant’s notion of objective sufficiency, all of which have implications for contemporary notions of justification.
Agentialism and Doxastic Voluntarism
There are several potential problems with the agentialist account of self-knowledge. As Richard Moran has acutely observed, one of the upshots of a transparency thesis regarding self-knowledge is that we are not simply passive observers of our mental lives. That is to say, it seems that the endorsement of a belief involves not only some deliberation over evidence, but also a decision as to what one should believe given that evidence. Moran, however, rejects doxastic voluntarism. I am interested in exploring how in cases of transparency, the agentialist can both require that the subject takes her beliefs to be in some sense ‘up to her’ and yet avoid endorsing doxastic voluntarism. One possible approach to this problem is via a Kantian theory of normativity, specifically the kind of moral motivation that is assumed in the second Critique.
Philosophy and Cognitive Science
Cognitive Penetration of Perception
The claim that perception is cognitively penetrable is, simply put, the claim that cognitive states can alter perception. Though there is general agreement that cognitive penetration involves some causal relation between cognitive states and perception, opinions diverge when it comes to specifying the effects of the proposed phenomenon. Questions regarding cognitive penetration typically take two forms depending on whether one is concerned with the effect of cognitive states on functional modules or whether one is concerned with the effect of cognitive states on the content of perceptual experience. There is strong evidence to suggest that the content of perceptual experience, specifically visual experience, is cognitively penetrable in the second sense. To be sure, there are arguments to the contrary (cf. Brogaard and Gatzia in particular) but these arguments tend to hinge on a confusion in our terminology. In this research project, I explore the limitations of these critiques and move to clarify the terminological issues that have emerged in this debate. Indeed, I think that part of the problem is a failure to keep separate the two forms that the questions surrounding cognitive penetration can take. A clear explication of our concepts is absolutely necessary if we are to make any progress on issues at the intersection of philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science.